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Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part Two:
Personalized Medicine and the
Legal Landscape
The idea of publishing an article on personalized medicine and
healthcare disparities among minority populations had its genesis
with the American Health Lawyers Association’s Advisory Council on
Racial and Ethnic Diversity. This two-part article was supported by the
Association’s Public Interest initiative and written by Jeffrey P. Braff,
Biswajit Chatterjee, Meredith Hochman, Jessica Kennington, Chandana
Kolavala, Katherine Layman, Corrine Parver, Chelsea S. Rice, Myra C. Selby,
John R. Washlick, and Rebecca Wolf. The authors’ biographical statements
appear on the following page.

ABSTRACT: In Part One, the authors addressed the relevance of genetic
information, and how race and genetics have affected and may impact the
development of medicines, pharmacogenomics, and personalized medicine in
the United States.* Part Two examines current and proposed federal and state
laws and regulations intended to protect individuals from the misuse of genetic
information, including uses that discriminate based on genetic predispositions.
This Part next explores the potential for litigation against both manufacturers
and providers, as well as potential defenses. The authors also discuss legal issues
relating to research that relies on the use of genetic information.

CITATION: American Health Lawyers Association’s Advisory Council on Racial and Ethnic
Diversity, Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part Two: Personalized Medicine and the Legal Landscape,
J. Health & Life Sci. L., January 2009, at 1. © 2009 American Health Lawyers Association,
www.healthlawyers.org/bookstore. All rights reserved.

*

Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n’s Advisory Council on Racial & Ethnic Diversity, Patient-Tailored
Medicine, Part One: The Impact of Race and Genetics on Medicine, J. Health & Life Sci. L. 1
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Introduction
Personalized medicine uses new methods in molecular analysis
to better manage a patient’s disease, or predisposition toward a disease. The goal is to achieve optimal medical outcomes by helping
physicians and patients choose patient-specific disease management
approaches based on a patient’s genetic profile. Such approaches may
include genetic screening programs that more precisely diagnose diseases and their sub-types, or that help physicians select the type and
dose of medication best tailored for a certain group of patients.1 Even
now, personalized medicine is affecting the way in which physicians
treat patients. For instance, molecular testing is being used to identify
those breast cancer and colon cancer patients likely to benefit from
new treatments, and patients newly diagnosed with early stage invasive
breast cancer are being tested for the likelihood of recurrence.2
As described in Part One of this series,3 the importance of studying
and mapping the human genome is beyond question. Data on human
genetic variations helps scientists to understand human origins, susceptibility to illness, and genetic causes of disease. Unfortunately,
history has been marked by destructive episodes of genetic research
and attempts at “ethnic cleansing” that make it crucial to consider
1
2
3

Personalized Med. Coal., Personalized Medicine 101, available at
www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/sciencepolicy/personalmed-101_overview.php
[hereinafter Personalized Medicine 101].
Id.
Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One, at 1.
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the ethical and social implications of research in genomics, especially
research on human genetic variation.4 Thus, an analysis of ethical,
legal, and social implications should be an integral component of
genetic research undertakings, with the participation of scientists who
can anticipate and monitor the full range of possible applications of
the research from the earliest stages.5 This issue is so important that the
U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Human Genome Program, which
oversees the Human Genome Project (HGP), devoted three percent
of its annual HGP budget toward studying the ethical, legal, and social
issues surrounding the availability of genetic information.6
Some of the most troubling ethical questions related to advancing
genetic knowledge and the ensuing development of personalized medicine arise out of issues related to justice and equity.7 As discussed in
Part One, raced-based differences in medicine8 and inequity in clinical trials for personalized medicine are ways in which unequal access
between people of different races can be perpetuated. While experts
note that race-based determination of medical treatment is temporary,
and a precursor to treatment that is determined person-by-person,9 the
current method of racial classification in medicine provides unequal
access between Caucasians and African-Americans.
Ultimately, the answer may lie in science rather than law. To prevent racial inequities in personalized medicine, Peterson-Iyer advises
mis-equating race with genotype.10 Rather than conducting race-based
clinical trials, she recommends that studies focus on the genotype of
study participants. Not only would this draw focus away from individuals’ arbitrary race classifications, but it likely would provide more
accurate results. Race-based genetic similarities are present only for
individuals whose recent ancestors are from the same area of the
world.11 For example, study participants in the African-American
Heart Failure Trial (A-HeFT), in which 1,050 self-identified AfricanAmericans participated,12 likely had ancestors from different regions
See Mildred K. Cho & Pamela Sankar, Forensic Genetics and Ethical, Legal and Social
Implications Beyond the Clinic, 36 Nature Genetics S8 (2004).
5 Id.
6 Humane Genome Project Info., Minorities, Race, and Genomics,
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/minorities.shtml
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
7 Karen Peterson-Iyer, Pharmacogenomics, Ethics, and Public Policy, 18 Kennedy Inst. Ethics J.
35, 38 (2008) [hereinafter Peterson-Iyer].
8 Id. at 41.
9 Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the Production of
Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 101, 128 (2004).
10 Peterson-Iyer, at 52.
11 Hua Tang et al., Genetic Structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and Confounding in CaseControl Association Studies, 76 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 268, 269–70 (2005).
12 Anne L. Taylor et al., Combination of Isosorbide Dinitrate and Hydralazine in Blacks with
Heart Failure, 351 New Eng. J. Med. 2049 (2004).
4
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of the world. Race is not a biological factor, but rather a “social or
cultural construct.”13 Race is a “pernicious concept that has been used
to suggest that human beings can be divided into subspecies, some of
which are morally, intellectually, and physically inferior to others.”14
All things considered, a race-based classification in medicine is a crude
and inadequate way to assign particular medical treatments, and may
fail to treat patients properly.15
Because of these significant issues, the Journal of Health & Life Sciences
Law features this two-part series on the topic of personalized or “patienttailored medicine.” In Part One, the authors addressed the relevance
of genetic information, and how race and genetics have affected and
may impact the development of medicines, pharmacogenomics, and
personalized medicine in the United States.16 Part Two examines
current and proposed federal and state laws and regulations intended
to protect individuals from the misuse of genetic information, including
uses that discriminate based on genetic predispositions. This Part next
explores the potential for litigation against both manufacturers and
providers, as well as potential defenses. The authors also discuss legal
issues relating to research that relies on the use of genetic information.
In sum, this Part examines the significant legal and ethical issues
facing the future of personalized medicine that tailors patient clinical
therapies based on the results of genetic testing.

Federal Legal Landscape
Federal laws specifically addressing personalized medicine are a
relatively new topic of discussion. Even before Congress enacted laws
aimed specifically against genetic discrimination, some commentators
interpreted other non-discrimination laws to include genetic discrimination. These include the Health Insurance and Portability Act of
1996 (HIPAA), the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Other laws and pronouncements address the use of genetic information more directly, such as the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and a 2000 Executive Order prohibiting use of federal employees’ genetic information
in employment decisions.17 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
13 Inst. of Med., The Unequal Burden of Cancer: An Assessment of NIH Research and Programs for
Ethnic Minorities and the Medically Underserved 38 (M. Alfred Haynes & Brian D. Smedley
eds. 1999).
14 Sharona Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored” Medicine Unraveled, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 395, 409
(2005) [hereinafter “Racially-Tailored” Medicine].
15 M. Gregg Bloche, Race-Based Therapeutics, 351 New Eng. J. Med. 2035, 2036 (2004).
16 Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One.
17 Human Genome Project Info., Genetics Privacy and Legislation: GINA Becomes Law
May 2008, www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.shtml
(last visited June 5, 2008) [hereinafter GINA Becomes Law].
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plays a key role in advancing personalized medicine, conducting
discussions, and convening debate about the implications for drug
development and regulatory review. Questions include issues such as
how narrowly clinical trials should be designed and whether efficacy is
defined in different ways for different genetic subgroups.18 The federal
government faces issues related to the reimbursement and payment
of personalized medicines as well. Public and private payers will have
new and complex questions, such as whether therapies should be reimbursed only for those patients who are identified as likely to respond to
treatment.19 The following sections explore these issues.

HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
provides, among other things, for the portability of health insurance
by ensuring that individuals who change health coverage do not have
new employment-related coverage denied or restricted on the basis
of preexisting conditions.20 Before the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act was passed in 2008, HIPAA was the only federal law
that directly addressed genetic discrimination.21 The portion of HIPAA
addressing portability of health insurance (HIPAA Portability Rule)
prohibits insurers who provide health coverage for a group of fifty or
more individuals from denying an applicant for health reasons, including reasons related to genetic information.22 (The HIPAA Privacy Rule,
also part of the HIPAA legislation enacted in 1996, will be addressed
below under Privacy protections and issues for providers.) HIPAA also
limits exclusions for preexisting conditions in group health plans to
twelve months, and it prohibits exclusions if an individual was covered
previously for that condition for at least twelve months.23
The HIPAA Portability Rule was the first federal law to address use of
genetic information in the health insurance context. It prohibits group
health plans and group health insurers from imposing a preexisting
condition exclusion on the basis of genetic information unless there
is an actual diagnosis of the condition related to the genetic information.24 HIPAA also prohibits establishing eligibility requirements for any
individual based on genetic information or other health-status factors.
Health insurers in the small-group market, employers with between two
and fifty employees, may not refuse to issue a policy on the basis of the
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Personalized Medicine 101.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1181; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg; 26 U.S.C. § 9801.
GINA Becomes Law.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1002(7); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg; 26 U.S.C. § 9801.
GINA Becomes Law.
29 U.S.C. § 1181(b)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(b)(1)(B); 26 U.S.C. § 9801(b)(1)(B).
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genetic information of any enrollee or any potential enrollee.25 Insurers in both the small and large group markets may not refuse to renew
a policy based on genetic information about an enrollee or a potential
enrollee.26
Nonetheless, the HIPAA Portability Rule was narrowly drawn. As
noted in a report commissioned by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, “HIPAA does not restrict a group
health plan or issuer from requesting, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining genetic information about an individual or [from] requiring an
individual to submit to a genetic test as a condition of coverage …”27
Nor does it prohibit the group health plan or issuer from charging
all members of the group higher premiums based on the information
obtained.28
Further, HIPAA does not prohibit employers from refusing to offer
health coverage as part of their benefits package. In addition, the
applicability of the preexisting condition exclusion and nondiscrimination provisions do not apply to individual health insurance policies,
very small plans, retiree-only coverage, and self-insured non-Federal
government plans.29 Lastly, the HIPAA Portability provisions do not
address the issues raised by gathering and using genetic information
in the workplace outside the health insurance context.30

ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employment, public
services, public accommodations, and communications discrimination against individuals with disabilities.31 Although Title I of the
ADA, enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), does not explicitly address genetic information, it does provide some protection against disability-related genetic discrimination
in the workplace.32
25 45 C.F.R. § 146.150.
26 Id. § 146.152.
27 Robert B. Lanman, Office of Biotech. Activities, Nat’l Insts. of Health, An Analysis
of the Adequacy of Current Law in Protecting Against Genetic Discrimination
in Health Insurance and Employment: A Report Commissioned by the Secretary ’s
Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society i (2005), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/legal_analysis_May2005.pdf
[hereinafter SACGHS Report].
28 Id. GINA does prohibit this, however, as discussed below.
29 Interim Final Rules for Nondiscrimination in Heath Coverage in the Group Market,
66 Fed. Reg. 1378, 1379 (Jan. 8, 2001); see also Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Genetic
Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v. Employer’s
Need to Know, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 139, 166–67 (2001).
30 See SACGHS Report, at 4.
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
32 GINA Becomes Law.
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The ADA defines the term “disability” with respect to an individual
as a person having:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such impairment.33
Although this language does not reference genetic traits, congressional debates in 1990 touched on the issue; however, Congress
apparently left it in the hands of the EEOC.34 In March 1995, the
EEOC issued an interpretation of the ADA that states: “Entities that
discriminate on the basis of genetic predisposition are regarding the
individuals as having impairments, and such individuals are covered by
the ADA.”35 This interpretation constitutes policy guidance that “does
not have the same legal binding effect on a court as a statute or regulation ….”36 Because the interpretation has yet to be tested in the legal
arena, it remains simply interpretive policy guidance.37
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to private
businesses, and provides that no individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation. However, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals has found that this nondiscrimination provision does
not apply to insurance policies.38
Finally, the “safe harbor provision” of the ADA, which provides that
the ADA’s provisions must not be interpreted to prohibit or restrict an
insurer from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering risks
consistent with state law, has been construed in favor of insurers.39

33 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(C).
34 Nancy Lee Jones & Amanda K. Sarata, CRS Report for Congress—Genetic Information:
Legal Issues Relating to Discrimination and Privacy 1 (Mar. 10, 2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30006_20080310.pdf [hereinafter CRS Report].
35 GINA Becomes Law.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)
(preclusion principles apply to administrative proceedings [only] when the administrative agency in the first action was “acting in a judicial capacity” and the parties had an
adequate opportunity to present their case); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000) (agency interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals,
and enforcement guidelines all lack the force of law).
38 SACGHS Report, at 5–6.
39 Id. at 6.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits all private employers with
15 or more workers, labor organizations, employment agencies, and
federal, state, and municipal government employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.40 The
statute does not specifically address discrimination based on genetic
discrimination, but Title VII may protect against discrimination on the
basis of an individual’s genetic makeup if that discrimination disproportionately impacts individuals belonging to a protected class. For
example, if an employer refuses to hire an individual who is a carrier
of the genetic mutation for Tay-Sachs disease, it is arguable that the
employer is discriminating against persons with an Eastern European
Jewish ethnic background, which would constitute prohibited disparate impact on the basis of national origin.41 However, protection is
available only where an employer engages in discrimination based on
a genetic trait substantially related to a particular race or ethnic group,
and there have been only a few diseases where such a strong relationship has been proven.42

The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
It is difficult to imagine information more personal
or more private than a person’s genetic makeup …
If Congress fails to make sure that genetic information is used only for legitimate purposes, we may well
squander the vast potential of genetic research to
improve the nation’s health.43
These words were spoken by Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy on January 22, 2007, in his introductory remarks to the Senate
regarding the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. On May 21,
2008—13 years after the legislation was initially introduced—Senator
Kennedy’s words and concerns were implemented into law when President Bush signed GINA.44
Congress had been attempting to pass federal protections against
genetic discrimination for over a decade. Although GINA passed overwhelmingly, there had been ongoing debates over the need for such
40
41
42
43

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e17; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
SACGHS Report.
GINA Becomes Law.
Introductory Remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) on the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act 1, 1–2 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at
www.geneticalliance.org/ksc_assets/publicpolicy/gina_remarks_kennedy.pdf.
44 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008) [hereinafter GINA]. GINA becomes effective in November 2009.
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federal legislation.45 Opponents noted that more than forty states prohibited genetic discrimination in health insurance, and more than
thirty states prohibited genetic discrimination in the workplace. They
also argued that the HIPAA Portability Rule and the ADA provided
sufficient protection from genetic discrimination, making GINA superfluous legislation. According to GINA’s opponents, ample safeguards
already were in place to prevent genetic discrimination.46
Despite these efforts, the law passed by an overwhelming majority in
the House of Representatives (414–1) and unanimously in the Senate.
The law amends Title VII, HIPAA, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC), and Title XVIII (Medicare) of the
Social Security Act, which collectively apply to group health plans with
any number of participants and health insurance issuers underwriting the plans’ benefits.47 Further, GINA applies to issuers of health
insurance policies in the individual markets,48 as well as to issuers of
“Medi-Gap” insurance policies, which supplement health coverage
available under the Medicare program.49 The net result is that virtually
all health insurers are subject to GINA’s nondiscrimination prohibition. Significantly, because GINA does not preempt existing state laws,
counsel must continue to identify state laws that offer greater protections.50 GINA’s preemption provision does not override state laws that
provide equal or greater protection against genetic discrimination,
and this likely will complicate compliance because of differing state
and federal standards.51
GINA fills in many of the perceived gaps in protection under
HIPAA. In addition to defining “genetic information” broadly,52 GINA
addresses discrimination in the workplace as well as in the health insurance arena. Not only does it prohibit both employers and group health
plans from discriminating on the basis of “genetic information,”53 it
also limits the ability of employers and group health plans to collect
genetic information.54
45 GINA Becomes Law.
46 Id.
47 29 U.S.C. § 1182(e); 26 U.S.C. § 9801(e); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b). See Marian Waldmann
et al., New Federal Law Regulates Collection and Use of Genetic Information by Employers
and Group Health Plans, 7 BNA Privacy & Security L. Rep. 764–69, May 19, 2008
[hereinafter BNA].
48 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-51.
49 GINA, tit. 1, § 104.
50 Id., tit. 2, § 209(3).
51 Kevin P. McGowan, Employer Advocates Remain Wary of New Bias Law’s Potential Effects,
BNA Daily Labor Report No. 99 (May 22, 2008).
52 GINA, tit. 1 §§ 101(6), 102(d)(4)(16), 103(d)(7), 104(3)(B); id. tit. 2 § 201(4).
53 See id. tit. 1 §§ 101(a), 102(a); id. tit. 2 § 202(a).
54 Id. tit. 1 §§ 101(b), 102(d); id. tit. 2 § 202(b).
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GINA expands Title VII by imposing broad restrictions on the collection, use, and disclosure of genetic information in the employment
context.55 GINA applies to all employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, and joint labor-management committees subject to
Title VII, and defines “genetic information” as not only the genetic tests
of employees and their family members, but also any “manifestation of
a disease or disorder” in the employee’s family members.56 Further, the
statute defines “family member” very expansively; it includes not only
the employee’s dependents, but also relatives of the employee, or of the
employee’s dependents, from the first to the fourth degree.57 In other
words, information about the employee’s father, grandfather, greatgrandfather, and great-great-grandfather would constitute genetic
information for purposes of GINA.
GINA imposes three principal restrictions on employers with
respect to genetic information. First, employers cannot discriminate in
the terms or conditions of employment based upon genetic information.58 Second, employers may not retaliate against an employee who
opposes genetic discrimination.59 Third, except in certain situations
described below, employers cannot collect genetic information about
an employee, or an employee’s family member, whether by request,
mandatory disclosure, or purchase from a third party.60
The restriction on collecting genetic information has several exceptions. GINA allows employers to request or require disclosure of a
family member’s genetic information, including manifested diseases
or disorders, to comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act and
with state family and medical leave laws.61 In addition, employers may
offer “genetic services” as an employee benefit. To qualify, an employee
must provide prior, voluntary, and written authorization for disclosure
of genetic information to the service provider.62
GINA incorporates Title VII provisions with respect to enforcement.
For instance, employees must exhaust all administrative remedies
before filing a lawsuit, and damages are subject to the same restrictions

55 The DOE Human Genome Project observed that genetic predisposition or conditions
can lead to workplace discrimination, even in cases where workers are healthy and
unlikely to develop a disease, or where the genetic condition has no effect on the ability to perform work. GINA Becomes Law.
56 GINA, tit. 1, § 101(a), (d).
57 Id. § 101(d)(5).
58 GINA, tit. 2, § 202(a)(1).
59 Id. § 207(f ).
60 Id. § 202(b).
61 Id. § 202(b)(3).
62 Id. § 202(b)(2)(B).
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as under Title VII.63 However, unlike Title VII, GINA does not permit
claims to be brought on a disparate impact theory.64
GINA prohibits insurance companies from discriminating against
individuals based on information derived from genetic tests.65 Group
health plans and insurance issuers cannot adjust contribution amounts
or premiums for the group based on the genetic information of any
plan participant. GINA prohibits insurance providers from requesting
or requiring that individuals or their family members undergo genetic
tests and from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information for underwriting purposes or prior to an individual’s enrollment.
Despite the expansive scope of GINA’s discrimination provisions
relating to health insurance, neither GINA nor any other federal law
addresses discrimination with respect to other insurance products,
including life insurance, disability insurance, and long-term care insurance. Questions that arise include:
1.	Whether insurance companies may require applicants to disclose genetic testing information;
2.	Whether applicants are required to disclose genetic testing
information on an application; and
3.	Whether genetic testing information may be used for underwriting purposes or for denying coverage.
There are differing opinions as to the potential for discrimination
in the life insurance industry. Some argue that it would be more actuarially fair for insurers to have access to genetic testing results, while
others argue that having the test results would not make a significant
difference. A medical director of an insurance company posed the
question, “[I]s it more ‘fair’ to require low-risk individuals to make
what is in effect an involuntary and non-tax-deductible donation to
help fund death benefits of others at a higher risk?”66
In reality, the use of genetic information in life insurance underwriting
is not a novel concept. Life insurers generally ask applicants about their
family medical history, revealing genetic information as defined under
GINA.67 In fact, a positive test result might have a negligible impact
on premiums or eligibility, because the insurance company would
have taken the predisposition into account through the family history
Id. § 207(a).
Id. § 208(a).
Id. § 102(a)(1).
William Nowlan, A Rational View of Insurance and Genetic Discrimination,
297 Sci. 195 (2002).
67 Yann Joly et al., Genetic Information and Life Insurance: A “Real” Risk?,
11 Eur. J. Hum. Genetics 561 (2003).

63
64
65
66
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questionnaire.68 Of course, a positive test result more specifically identifies
an individual’s genetic risk factors than would a family history.
The passage of GINA represents progress in the protection of
genetic testing and personalized medicine and, while it is not perfect,
it provides a number of safeguards, such as protecting individuals who
have a genetic predisposition or have been diagnosed with a disease.69
Further, by prohibiting insurers and employers from requiring genetic
tests and using genetic information to discriminate, GINA provides the
groundwork for additional federal and local protections against genetic
discrimination and supports the use of personalized medicine.

Executive Order protecting federal employees
On February 8, 2000, President Clinton signed an Executive Order
prohibiting every federal department and agency from using genetic
information in any hiring or promotion action.70 This Executive Order,
endorsed by the American Medical Association, American College of
Medical Genetics, National Society of Genetic Counselors, and the
Genetic Alliance:
•

Prohibits federal employers from requiring or requesting
genetic tests as a condition of being hired or receiving benefits.
Employers cannot request or require employees to undergo
genetic tests to evaluate an employee’s ability to perform his or
her job.

•

Prohibits federal employers from using protected genetic information to classify employees in a manner that deprives them of
advancement opportunities. Employers cannot deny employees
promotions or overseas posts because of a genetic predisposition for certain illnesses.

•

Provides strong privacy protections for any genetic information
used for medical treatment and research. Obtaining or disclosing
genetic information about employees or potential employees is
prohibited, except when necessary to provide medical treatment
to employees, ensure workplace health and safety, or provide
occupational and health researchers access to data. In every case
where genetic information about employees is obtained, it will
be subject to all federal and state privacy protections.

68 Mark A. Rothstein & Mary R. Anderlik, What Is Genetic Discrimination, and When and
How Can It Be Prevented?, 5 Genetics Med. 354 (2001).
69 H.R. 493, S. 358.
70 Exec. Order, To Prohibit Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic
Information (Feb. 8, 2000), available at www.opm.gov/pressrel/2000/genetic_eo.htm.
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Food and Drug Administration
Although personalized medicine is an exciting phenomenon that
has the potential of revolutionizing medicine, many obstacles remain.71
As discussed in detail in Part One of this series, clinical trials for drug
safety and effectiveness often fail to include minority participants.
According to FDA, participation of African-Americans in clinical trials
declined from 12 to 6% from 1995 to 1999.72 As a result of this lack of
participation, much is unknown about the way in which an individual
of an under-included ethnic background will react to certain medications. This prevents FDA from accurately providing information about
the efficacy, safety, and usage of drugs for those populations. As a result,
when physicians prescribe drugs to underrepresented populations it is
often difficult for them to know how effective or harmful a particular
drug will be to a particular individual.73
As described in detail in Part One of this series,74 FDA’s recent
involvement with personalized medicine was demonstrated in the
African-American Heart Failure Trial (A-HeFT). In 2005, BiDil was
approved by FDA for treating heart failure in African-Americans
based on the results of the A-HeFT trial. This was the first time that
FDA approved a therapy for a specific racial group. A number of scientific and policy concerns have arisen as a result,75 notably that the
“differential drug response” has not been sufficiently tested. The FDA
responded that its approval of BiDil to treat heart failure in AfricanAmerican patients, but not white patients, was scientifically reasonable
and data-based.76 From a policy point of view, the approval suggests
that racially specific drugs might be at least part of the solution to the
problem of racial disparities in health in the United States, thereby
minimizing the broad public health issues associated with disparities
and socio-economic status.
Treatment for HIV disease may provide another opportunity for
personalized medicine. Discoveries of anti-HIV drugs have brought the
potential armamentarium of treatments to more than twenty agents in
four drug groups.77 A number of studies dealing with anti-HIV drugs
71 Neal Learner, The Promise of Personalized Medicine Is Exciting, but Barriers Remain,
Along with Questions About How to Achieve ROI, AIS Health, May 16, 2008, available at
www.aishealth.com/Bnow/hbd051608.html [hereinafter Promise of Personalized Medicine].
72 Vivek K. Murthy et al., Participation in Cancer Clinical Trials: Race-, Sex-, and Age-Based
Disparities, 291 JAMA 2720 (2004).
73 Promise of Personalized Medicine, at 5.
74 Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One, at 29, 30.
75 Kirsten Bibbins-Domingo & Alicia Fernandez, BiDil for Heart Failure in Black Patients:
Implications of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Approval, 146 Annals Internal Med.
52 (2007).
76 Robert Temple & Norman L. Stockbridge, BiDil for Heart Failure in Black Patients:
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration Perspective, 146 Annals Internal Med. 57 (2007).
77 Tim R. Cressey & Marc Lallemant, Pharmacogenetics of Antiretroviral Drugs for the Treatment of HIV-Infected Patients: An Update, 7 Infection, Genetics & Evolution 333–42 (2007).
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have indicated that genetic polymorphisms (polymorphisms are genetic
variants that appear in at least one percent of a population) may play
a role in both toxicity and response to treatment,78 but only one study
specifically designed to test this hypothesis has been carried out with
anti-HIV drugs. In that study, it was shown that there are race/ethnicspecific differences in plasma lipid levels.79
Thus, for moral and policy reasons, the FDA has recognized the
need to foster race-based therapies. Significantly, the FDA advisory
committee asserted that a major rationale for approving BiDil was the
“moral[ ] imperative” to remedy long-standing and “significant health
disparities among blacks.”80 African-Americans and other racial and
ethnic minorities suffer disproportionately from heart disease, cancer,
diabetes, and HIV.81 All of these groups suffer unique healthcare disparities that could be remedied by tailored therapies.82

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and Medicare Part D
In addition to treatment difficulties that result from a paucity of
information about minority populations’ reactions to particular
medications, cost concerns arise. As innovations make possible more
extensive treatment on an individual basis than ever before, health
financing systems fail to address the rising costs of personalized medicine, particularly for minority populations.
In policies related to medical treatments, particularly pharmaceuticals, cost and quality of healthcare are inextricably linked. In the
past several years, Congress has enacted significant bills related to
drug payments for Medicare beneficiaries that may affect the ability of
minorities to access patient-tailored medicine. On December 8, 2003,
Congress enacted the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act,83 a prescription drug benefit for Medicare
beneficiaries. This legislation prohibited the Medicare program from
bargaining with pharmaceutical companies to lower the prices of prescription drugs. Under the 2003 law, private prescription drug plans
(PDPs) rather than government agencies became responsible for mod-

78 Id.
79 Andrea S. Foulkes et al., Associations Among Race/Ethnicity, ApoC-III Genotypes, and
Lipids in HIV-1-Infected Individuals on Antiretroviral Therapy, 3 PLoS Med. e52 (2006).
For a more detailed explanation, see Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part One, at 29, 30.
80 Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, Racializing Drug Design: Implications of Pharmacogenomics for
Health Disparities, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 2133, 2137 (2005).
81 See generally Michael B. Losow, Personalized Medicine & Race-Based Drug Development:
Addressing Minority Health Care Disparities in an Ethically Charged Area, 20 St. John’s J.
Legal Comment. 15, 16–17 (2005).
82 Id.
83 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
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erating drug plans.84 The prices that PDPs establish directly affect the
costs that Medicare beneficiaries—and taxpayers, who pay for threefourths of Medicare Part D—incur.85
Under the Medicare Part D benefit, use of preferred drug lists
(PDLs) is a rapidly expanding phenomenon86 in which providers
attempt to save money on prescription drugs by providing only “preferred” medications. While individuals with private health insurance
may enjoy more personalized care in pharmaceutical treatment,
restrictive formularies and PDLs may cause difficulties for individuals from minority groups who receive Medicare, Medicaid, and other
health insurance.87 Studies have shown that the use of PDLs often can
result in negative health outcomes.88 Minority populations likely will
feel these negative effects more profoundly than their non-minority
counterparts.89 Because clinical trials often fail to include representation of minority groups, there tends to be a paucity of clinical trial data
about the efficacy of drug treatments for these populations. Due to this
lack of information, physicians would need greater latitude to determine the best course of treatment for minority patients.
Governments generally choose to contain costs rather than spend
necessary funds to ensure that minority patients receive the best treatment.90 As a result, minority populations, the individuals who would
benefit most from personal health assessments, are least likely to receive
individualized care. Even if drugs are designed to address the unique
medical needs of minority populations, individuals likely will not have
access to specialized medications, as it is unlikely that Medicare Part D
will cover the high costs of unique drugs. Medicare Part D provides:
If a Part D plan sponsor maintains a formulary tier in
which it places very high cost and unique items, such as
genomic and biotech products, the sponsor may design
its exception process so that very high cost or unique
drugs are not eligible for a tiering exception.91
84 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111. See Gary A. Puckrein et al., Nat’l Minority Health Month Found.,
Drug Prices and the Emerging Majority: Should Government Negotiate Drug Prices? 3, available
at www.nmhmf.org/issuebrief.pdf [hereinafter Drug Prices and the Emerging Majority].
85 Id. at iv.
86 In 2003, 29 states had obtained legislative approval to institute a preferred drug list
(PDL). Mary Kay Owens, Nat’l Pharm. Council, State Medicaid Program Issues: Preferred Drug
Lists 1 (2004), available at www.npcnow.org/resources/PDFs/PDLbrief.pdf.
87 Drug Prices and the Emerging Majority.
88 Matthew M. Murawski & Tamer Abdelgawad, Exploration of the Impact of Preferred Drug
Lists on Hospital and Physician Visits and the Costs to Medicaid, 11 Am. J. Managed Care
SP35 (2005).
89 Alvin Headen & Neal Masia, Exploring the Potential Link Between Medicaid Access Restrictions, Physician Location, and Health Disparities, 11 Am. J. Managed Care SP21 (2005).
90 Drug Prices and the Emerging Majority.
91 42 C.F.R. § 423.578(a)(7). See Pi-Yi Mayo, Medicare Part D, Houston Law., May/June 2006,
available at www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_may06/page22.htm.
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Failing to address the unique health needs of minorities not only
will affect disadvantaged individuals negatively, but also will affect the
entire American population negatively in the long run. Minority populations tend to receive health treatment later in the disease progression
than their non-minority counterparts. As a result, when minorities do
receive treatment, the financial cost may be much greater.92 Thus,
from a societal perspective, treatment at a later stage puts a much
greater strain on the health system. While disadvantaged populations
will “bear the immediate burden of those decisions,”93 ultimately the
entire population will be affected by inequities in treatment and dis
parate understanding of the health needs of minority populations.
Despite potential drawbacks and cost-containment concerns, personalized medicine has the potential of improving drug delivery and
optimizing spending on pharmaceuticals. According to Robert Epstein,
M.D., Chief Medical Officer at Medico Health Solutions:
We think it is one of the key ways to manage drug
expenditures in the near future. Because you can
move beyond the debate of unit costs to who is really
supposed to be taking the drugs, and who is really
going to benefit from it, and who is really going to
have a bad side effect. If you can take those cuts out,
using science, you’re going to definitely save money
and improve effectiveness.94
If personalized medicine does, in fact, improve efficiency and
improve spending for drug treatments, then initial increases in drug
costs will be worth the investment in the long run.

State Legislative Landscape
States have a patchwork of genetic-information nondiscrimination
laws, none of them comprehensive.95 State laws differ in coverage, protections afforded, and enforcement mechanisms.96 In 1991, Wisconsin
became the first state to enact a comprehensive law prohibiting discrimination based on genetic test results. Currently, at least 34 states and
the District of Columbia have enacted laws prohibiting some form of

92 Kristi V. Mizelle, Student National Medical Association: Minority Health Disparities Positions Statement
(2002), available at www.snma.org/downloads/snma_minority_health_disparities.pdf.
93 Drug Prices and the Emerging Majority, at ii.
94 Neal Learner, The Promise of Personalized Medicine Is Exciting, but Barriers Remain,
Along with Questions About How to Achieve ROI, AIS Health, May 16, 2008,
available at www.aishealth.com/Bnow/hbd051608.html.
95 More information on state-specific genetics bills is available from the National Conference
of State Legislatures at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/geneticsDB.cfm.
96 See CRS Report.
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genetic discrimination in employment.97 Although the scope and function of these laws vary widely, they all prohibit discrimination based on
the results of genetic tests. Many extend the protections to inherited
characteristics, including family history and family member test results.
Most states restrict employers from accessing genetic information; some
prohibit employers from requesting, requiring, and obtaining genetic
information or test results, albeit with exceptions for situations such as
identifying individuals who may be a safety risk in the workplace.98
Some states extend protections against genetic discrimination to
healthcare and other contexts. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Texas explicitly prohibit medical facilities from providing
discriminatory medical treatment. Other states have Patients’ Bills of
Rights that “prohibit race discrimination in health care,” or prohibit
discrimination in distribution of state services.
Forty-seven states have enacted laws pertaining to the use of genetic
information in health insurance.99 These states generally prohibit
•

using genetic information to determine eligibility,

•

using genetic information to set premiums for risk selection and
risk classification,

•

requiring genetic testing of applicants, or

•

disclosing genetic information without consent.100

However, state laws do not govern the use of genetic information
in employer-sponsored health benefit plans, which are exempt from
state insurance laws due to ERISA preemption.101 As it has been estimated that more than one-third of the employed insured population is
insured through self-funded plans, the ERISA exemption significantly
limits the application of these state laws.102
Fewer states have enacted laws restricting the use of genetic information in life, disability, and long-term care insurance. For example, only
seven states prohibit genetic discrimination in life insurance without actu97 These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See NCSL, State Genetics Employment
Laws, available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndiscrim.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2008).
98 Id.
99 NCSL, Genetics and Health Insurance State Anti-Discrimination Laws, available at
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
100 Id.
101 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1145.
102 CRS Report, at 21 (citing Kathy L. Hudson et. al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance:
An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 Sci. 391 (1995) and Karen H. Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State Legislative Approaches, 23 J. L. Med. & Ethics 312 (1995).
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arial justification.103 Three states also prohibit genetic discrimination in
disability insurance without actuarial justification.104 Only three states prohibit genetic discrimination in disability and long-term care insurance.105
Some commentators believe that before personalized medicine can
be fully realized, there is a need for new regulatory approaches and
stronger patient privacy protection laws.106 However, despite the differing
state approaches to genetic discrimination, GINA goes a long way—as it
was intended to do—in providing a federal floor of protection against
discrimination to allow personalized medicine to continue to evolve.

Litigation Challenges and Trends
This section describes manufacturer and provider liabilities, litigation
risks, and protections when dealing with patient-tailored medicines.

Manufacturers’ risks
Roadblocks and impediments on the path toward personalized medicine continue to persist. Personalized medicine represents only a very
small portion of the healthcare sector, where “blockbuster drugs” are
still defined as $1-billion-a-year sellers that target the largest number of
patients with a disease. Thus, tailoring drugs to particular individuals
poses a challenge to traditional pharmaceutical companies by suggesting that new drugs will target smaller populations.107 This focus on
genetic information raises numerous cost and ethical concerns, which
may create new risks of liability for manufacturers.

Inadequate warning liability
In the most common type of tort suit against pharmaceutical manufacturers, the plaintiff asserts a drug company is liable for failing to warn
consumers of dangers that the company itself should have foreseen
and disclosed.108 Personalized medicine would subject manufacturers
103 The seven states are Arizona, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey,
and New Mexico. See NCSL, Genetics and Life, Disability and Long-term Care Insurance,
available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndislife.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2008).
104 The states are Arizona, Maine, and New Jersey. Id.
105 These states are Massachusetts, Montana, and New Mexico. Id.
106 Jacqueline Risher, Personalized Medicine: The Promise and Realities
of Healthcare Tailored to You, Suite101.com, June 22, 2008,
http://healthfieldmedicare.suite101.com/article.cfm/personalized_medicine
(last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
107 Rick Mullin, Armed with the Decoded Human Genome, Drug Researchers and Clinicians
Are Working to Close the Gap Between Patient and Therapy, 86 Chemical & Engineering
News 17 (2008), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/86/8606cover.html.
108 Bernard J. Garbutt & Melinda E. Hofmann, Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical
Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, the Learned Intermediary Defense, and Other Issues
in the New Millennium, 58 Food & Drug L.J. 269 (2003) [hereinafter Recent Developments
in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law].
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to heightened duties to disclose risks to consumers, and to provide
clear instructions to providers.
In an environment of patient-tailored medicines, manufacturers
of race/ethnicity-based therapies would be expected to know the risks
peculiar to the differentiated populations for which they develop and
market pharmaceuticals. Thus, a “manufacturer may face liability if
[clinical] data show that certain genotypes are more susceptible to
adverse side effects to a drug that is subsequently marketed without
adequate genetic warnings.”109
The basic premise of race/ethnicity-based therapies is that they are
safer and more effective than other drugs for particular genomic populations. In the past, courts did not recognize inadequate warning claims
by hypersensitive individuals and small groups because a manufacturer
could not have known of those rare risks. Pharmacogenomic research
changes that rationale.110 Now, courts are more likely to impose greater
duties upon manufacturers to warn consumers of risks revealed by
advances in pharmacogenomic research. For example, a class action
suit involving the manufacturer of LYMErix, a lyme disease vaccine,
alleged that the drug manufacturer should have known about peculiar risks presented by the drug for only 30 percent of the population.
Rather than fight in court, the manufacturer agreed to a settlement
and withdrew the vaccine.111
The history of healthcare disparities in the United States, discussed
in Part One of this series, may contribute to expanded liability as well.
Race-based therapies likely will result in increased litigation for inadequate warnings, precisely because the therapies are targeted toward
populations that traditionally have been victims of discrimination; it is
logical to expect that because victims of racism are more likely to be
apprehensive, they will be more determined to prevent future racial
discrimination. Manufacturers of these therapies would be prudent
to ensure as full a level of disclosure of knowable risks as possible to
minimize potential litigation from the consumers of those therapies.
On the other hand, failure to adequately apprise consumers of unique
race-based risks could open drug manufacturers not only to an initial
wave of litigation from injured consumers, but also to subsequent waves
of litigation from the compounding effect of negative public relations
based upon charges of exploitation of vulnerable populations.

109 Id.
110 Lars Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients’
Genetic Profiles, 43 Jurimetrics J. 1, 25–26 (2002).
111 Gary E. Marchant, Personalized Medicine and the Law, 44 Ariz. Att’y 12, 16 (2007).
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Design defect liability
Personalized medical care may create a greater likelihood of more
successful and frequent design defect claims. Personalized medicine and associated genetic screening tests would create a consumer
expectation that the drugs are designed for individual use. The more
effective personalized medicine becomes, the more purchasers will
perceive their care to be on the cutting edge of pharmaceuticals.112 If
manufacturers know about the benefits of the drugs for a particular
population, they will be expected to know the risks as well.113
On the other hand, tailored therapies may face fewer liabilities
related to design defects, based on a risk-utility balancing test that
considers consumer expectations.114 That is, if a tailored therapy is
demonstrated to be particularly safe and effective for use by a particular subgroup of the population, it would present a lower risk of liability
(even though it would cause adverse side effects in the general population). Targeted therapies would
•
•
•

pose lower risks to targeted demographics than drugs designed
for the general population,
have higher utility due to increased effectiveness for that subgroup, and
engender “reasonable” consumer expectations that the tailored therapy be only as safe and effective as current market
alternatives.

Breach of implied warranty
While plaintiffs’ product liability claims based on a drug’s failure
to be effective generally have not been successful, in patient-tailored
medicine, there are compelling rationales for courts to find merit in
claims based on the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
A key reason for this shift is the policy goal of assuring that race-based
therapies and other pharmacogenomic medicines meet expectations
of being safer than other drugs for the populations to which they advertise. From a legal perspective, race-based therapies will meet the two
elements of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose: (1) The
seller will have knowledge of the consumer’s reasons for purchase (the
drugs will actually be developed for specific genotypes with specific
112 Barbara J. Evans, What Will it Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics?,
61 Food & Drug L.J. 753, 792 (2006) (comparing the difference between designing
pharmacogenomic drugs and traditional drugs to that between a “jet” and a
“propeller biplane”) [hereinafter Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics].
113 Id.
114 Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement,
and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 889, 925 (2005).
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health problems); and (2) The consumer will rely on the seller’s representation, both implicit and otherwise, that the drug is effective as
marketed (especially due to the perception that these drugs are more
targeted than traditional drugs).115

Informed consent of research subjects
There may be potential liability for manufacturers who do not fully
inform racial and ethnic minority research subjects that they are being
used to test a commercially viable, race-based drug. As discussed in detail
in Part One of this series, the Tuskegee syphilis experiments created
a level of distrust towards clinical research by African-Americans that
exists to this day.116 Given this history, race-based medicine researchers
who do not disclose significant dangers to their participants likely
would face punitive damages for recklessly endangering the safety of
minority participants.
“Currently, the states are almost evenly split between two types
of standards for informed consent—the physician-based standard,
effective in [twenty-five] states, and the patient-based standard, effective in [twenty-three] states and the District of Columbia.”117 Under
both standards, in the treatment context, physicians have a duty to
inform the patient of all “risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment”
that a patient needs to make a decision about his or her course of
treatment, if any, but the two standards for satisfying that duty are distinct.118 Under the physician-based standard, a physician must provide
informed consent to a patient “in the same manner that a ‘reasonably
prudent practitioner’ in the field would.”119 The patient-centered standard of disclosure requires that information be provided to the patient
in the manner that “a ‘reasonable patient’ would attach significance
to in making a treatment decision.”120 The modern, or emerging, standard for informed consent is the patient-centered standard.121
Because race-based pharmacogenomic drugs will be on the cutting
edge of scientific knowledge, it will be difficult for personalized medicine researchers to draft informed consent disclosures that adequately
identify material risks—but they must do so under both approaches.
This could result in a blanket permission for genetic research, which
115 Wayne M. Serra, Ensuring the Safety of Genotech Drugs Through Implied Warranty Theory,
23 Am. J.L. & Med. 363, 380–81 (1997).
116 “Racially-Tailored” Medicine, at 426–27.
117 Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for
Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 Am. J.L. & Med. 429, 430 (2006).
118 Id.
119 Id. (citing Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002)).
120 Id.
121 Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics, at 772.

Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 2

Litigation Challenges and Trends

25

generally is considered morally problematic.122 However, to the degree
that jurisdictions with physician-based standards of informed consent
are more reluctant to impose liability upon physician researchers of tailored therapies, researchers and their employing manufacturers may
find it advantageous to conduct research from those jurisdictions.
Race-based tailored therapy manufacturers also should ensure that
subjects are fully informed of the commercial potential of any successful outcomes. In a landmark 1990 California case, Moore v. Regents of
the University of California,123 the Supreme Court of California imposed
a duty upon a physician researcher to disclose potentially conflicting
economic and research interests, citing the physician’s fiduciary duty
to reveal all material facts relevant to the patient’s decision.124 The
Moore court also held out the possibility that private companies could
be liable under a vicarious liability theory, such as respondeat superior,
for the inadequate disclosure of commercial interests to the research
subject by failing to disclose that the physician researcher was paid
by the manufacturer.125 For a broader discussion of genetic research,
see Research and Patient-Tailored Medicine, beginning on page 36.

Defenses available to manufacturers
Although there are policy justifications for compensating consumers of race-based therapies for personal injuries, there is an even
greater countervailing need to improve racial minorities’ access to
drugs. Until manufacturers of race-based therapies demonstrate sound
business models that can pass on liability costs, courts should be careful not to impose crushing awards for technologically innovative drugs.
It remains to be seen whether race-based therapies will prove to be
profitable ventures in the short term. For example, BiDil’s initial sales
projections of $130 million per year never materialized. The drug produced revenues of $12 million in 2006, over ten times less than the
goal.126 As a result, BiDil’s manufacturer, NitroMed, has discontinued
marketing, though it will continue to produce the drug.127 The following sections explore possible defenses for the manufacturers of
patient-tailored medicines.

122 Richard R. Sharp, The Evolution of Predictive Genetic Testing: Deciphering
Gene-Environment Interactions, 41 Jurimetrics J. 145, 160 (2001).
123 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 133 (1990).
124 Id. at 131–33.
125 Id. at 133.
126 David Armstrong, Nitromed Halts Marketing of Drug, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 2008, at D8.
127 Id.
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FDA preemption
There is a strong possibility that FDA regulation will preempt the
entire field of pharmaceutical personal injury litigation. In 2008, in Riegel
v. Medtronic,128 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized FDA preemption of
suits against defective medical devices. The majority opinion rejected
any state-level liability exposure for defective medical devices that are
FDA approved.129 Medtronic was resolved based on express preemption
provisions of the applicable federal statute at issue in the case, i.e., the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976.130 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, seemed to favor broad FDA preemption of state common law
tort liability, going so far as to express reservations about allowing FDA
to define parameters for narrowing the scope of preemption.131 The
court’s rationale demonstrates the Supreme Court’s current attitude
towards FDA preemption in general and is equally applicable to FDA
preemption of pharmaceutical litigation.
However, the Supreme Court has not issued a definitive decision
on whether FDA approval should preempt all state-level personal
injury litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers.132 The Court
will decide the issue in the landmark case of Wyeth v. Levine,133 argued
in November 2008, and possibly preempt the entire area of personal
injury lawsuits for pharmaceuticals—even though the majority of lower
courts have been unreceptive to FDA preemption of state-level personal injury claims.134
Courts could become instruments of redistributive justice, forcing innovative pharmaceutical products like race-based therapies to
exit the market. On the other hand, court decisions could set back
advancements in the health of Americans by depressing sales in tailored
therapies. The absence of state tort ramifications could encourage riskaverse companies to enter the pharmacogenomics market.
128 Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008). See Linda Greenhouse et al., Justices
Shield Medical Devices from Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2008, at 1, available at
www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/washington/21device.html [hereinafter Justices Shield
Medical Devices]. See also Biswajit Chatterjee, Washington Update: Court Rules in Favor of
FDA Preemption in Medical Devices, 2 Health L. & Pol’y 94 (2008) [hereinafter Washington
Update].
129 Justices Shield Medical Devices. See also Washington Update.
130 Christen L. Young, Agency Preemption Inputs in Riegel v. Medtronic, Yale L.J. (online companion), July 9, 2008, available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2008/07/09/young.html.
131 Id.
132 Warner-Lambert v. Kent, No. 06-1498, 1 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2008), available at
www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1498.pdf; see also Washington Update.
133 Wyeth v. Levine, 2006 VT 107 (2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (oral argument
Nov. 3, 2008). Docket available at www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/06-1249.htm. See
also Gardiner Harris, Court Considers Protecting Drug Makers From Lawsuits, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 26, 2008, at 1, available at www.nytimes.com/2008/02/26//washington/26drug.html
[hereinafter Protecting Drug Makers From Lawsuits]; see also Washington Update.
134 Protecting Drug Makers From Lawsuits; see also Washington Update.
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Learned intermediary doctrine
Regardless of the outcome on the preemption argument, other
avenues to mitigate liability remain. A prime pharmaceutical company
defense against litigation has been the learned intermediary doctrine,
which undoubtedly will be relied upon in litigation against pharmaco
genomic drug manufacturers. To date, most personalized medicines
have been prescription drugs, thereby especially necessitating the doctrine’s application.
The learned intermediary doctrine absolves the manufacturer of the
duty for adequate warnings as long as the company gives direct and adequate warnings to the physician, because the physician has specialized
knowledge, prescribes the medicines, and advises the patient of appropriate medications.135 While most jurisdictions recognize the learned
intermediary defense, there is an evolving trend among a minority of
jurisdictions to reject the defense, or to provide exceptions, when the
manufacturer issues direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising.136
In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,137 for example, New Jersey’s Supreme
Court in 1999 recognized an exception, finding that the underpinnings of the learned intermediary doctrine had been chipped away
by the prevalence of pharmaceutical companies advertising directly to
consumers, effectively bypassing and negating the traditional physicianpatient treatment relationship.138 In 2007, West Virginia’s Supreme
Court followed suit and expanded the Perez holding, rejecting outright
the learned intermediary doctrine in any situation, largely because of
DTC ads.139
Key premises of the learned intermediary doctrine will be inapplicable to tailored therapies. A physician will not be acting as a “learned
intermediary” to nearly the same extent with pharmacogenomic
drugs because both drug makers and patients will rely less on physicians, and more on manufacturers, to make determinations about
whether a drug should be prescribed.140 It is likely that manufacturers
Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law, at 272–73.
Id. at 275.
Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (1999).
Recent Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law, at 273–75.
State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007).
See Nixon Peabody LLP, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Declines to
Adopt Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Prescription Drug Failure-to-Warn Case,
Pharmaceutical, Med. Device & Life Scis. Alert (July 2007), available at
www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/JulyAlert.pdf;
see also Drug & Device Law, In Defense of the Learned Intermediary Rule,
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/07/in-defense-of-learned-intermediary-rule.html
(July 6, 2007).
140 Timothy A. Pratt & John F. Kuckelman, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, at 7, www.thefederation.org/documents/pratt.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter The Learned Intermediary].
135
136
137
138
139
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of tailored therapies will engage heavily in DTC marketing to specific
population subgroups141—that is, to the self-identified persons of particular races, ethnicities, and subgroups that a given tailored therapy
are designed to help. The manufacturers, rather than physicians, will
have the pharmacogenomic research basis to tailor warnings to specific subgroups.142
Nonetheless, four main rationales for the learned intermediary
defense continue today:
[1] prescription drugs remain complex and a physician must act as a learned intermediary in the process
of prescribing a drug;
[2]… physicians remain in a superior position
to convey meaningful information to individual
patients;
[3]… even though a manufacturer can communicate
with patients through advertising, a manufacturer
cannot effectively tailor warnings specifically for
individual patients … and
[4] requiring a manufacturer to warn a consumer
directly imposes the manufacturer into the patientphysician relationship.143
Thus, as for off-label drugs, the learned intermediary doctrine may
continue to be an especially apt defense to pharmacogenomic drug
manufacturer liability, as these manufacturers could better shift the
burdens for proper prescription upon the physician. Off-label use of
ordinary pharmaceuticals is a commonly accepted practice in which
physicians prescribe drugs to untested subgroups or for untested uses
not originally approved by FDA.144 A traditional drug that fails to mention use for a given subpopulation does not necessarily mean that the
drug is unsafe or ineffective.145 For personalized medicines, however,
physicians may risk malpractice claims for off-label drug recommendations when adverse side effects occur—off-label use for unapproved
population groups of pharmacogenomic drugs could connote that the
nonindicated use would be unsafe or ineffective.146 “For genetically
targeted therapies, the lack of an approved indication in labeling may
be “with prejudice,” i.e., it may mean, “this use may be bad,” rather
141 Alix Weisfeld, How Much Intellectual Property Do the Newest (and Coolest) Biotech
nologies Get Internationally?, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 833, 836 (2005).
142 The Learned Intermediary, at 7.
143 Id.
144 Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics, at 783.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 784.
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than merely “this use was never tested.”147 As such, physicians should
tread a careful path in prescribing racially, ethnically, or sex-targeted
drugs to untested subgroups, and manufacturers should monitor the
application of the learned intermediary defense in the context of
patient-tailored drug therapies.

Provider risks
Use of patient-tailored prescription drugs may create a unique set
of challenges for physicians. Physicians may be subject to malpractice liability for side effects associated with generic use of race-based
medicines. Physicians might be placed in the uncomfortable situation in which they need to discern a particular individual’s racial
background by asking a series of probing questions. Further, physicians might be subject to malpractice liability for failing to refer a
patient to a genetic counselor for race-based medicines. Ultimately,
physicians may be forced to confront privacy issues in attempts to
provide a particular patient with the best treatment possible, given
that individual’s racial and ethnic background.

Off-label prescription of pharmacogenomic drugs
Even though generic use, in which physicians prescribe drugs to
untested subgroups or for untested uses not approved by FDA, of ordinary pharmaceuticals is a commonly accepted practice, physicians
could be subject to malpractice liability for generic uses of racebased medicines when adverse side effects occur.148 For conventional
pharmaceuticals, the failure of the drug label to mention its safety for
a given racial group does not mean that the drug is unsafe or ineffective for that group.149 However, for patient-tailored therapies, generic
use could constitute experimental treatment.150 This could be a concern for physicians when patients request a prescription for a specific
racially targeted therapy, or when a physician wishes to ensure that
only persons of appropriate genotypes are recommended for tailored
therapies. For example, it would not appear to make sense to recommend BiDil to Caucasian patients when it is targeted to self-identified
African-Americans.
As a result, physicians could be placed in the awkward position of
having to discern subtle differences in race and ethnicity. Physicians
could face claims for violation of anti-discrimination mandates if they
base prescription decisions for race-based medicines upon their sub147
148
149
150

Id.
Id. at 783.
Id.
Id.
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jective perceptions of a patient’s racial or ethnic identity.151 Interracial
individuals also could be problematic for physicians’ prescription decisions. Physicians may be forced to find objective means to make such
decisions. Besides pharmacogenomic tests, another avenue of determining if a race-based treatment is appropriate for an individual would
be to conduct probing and detailed questioning of the individual’s
ethnic ancestry.152 A more scientific alternative solution for ascertaining ethnic identity would be to order a haplotype test to ascertain a
patient’s geographic ancestry.153

Failure to refer and conduct screenings
Physicians also may be subject to malpractice liability for failing to
refer a candidate for race-based medicines to genetic counselors.154
Because physicians would be expected to guide their patients in the use
of innovative pharmacogenomic medicines, physicians could be held
liable for inappropriately relying on race as the sole proxy for a genetic
profile.155 This could result in inappropriately denying a treatment to
persons of another racial group than that targeted by a racially tailored
therapy, but who have the same “genetic variant.”156 Relying on race
as a proxy also could cause physicians to provide the treatment inappropriately to persons of the targeted racial group, even though some
members of that race would not have the assumed genetic profile.157
This risk raises an associated need for physicians to provide pharmaco
genomic screening tests to ascertain the suitability of patients for any
race-based medicines.158

Privacy protections and issues for providers
The Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Elias A.
Zerhouni, M.D., stated that “comprehensive, genomics-based health
care will become the norm, with individualized preventive medicine
and early detection of illnesses.”159 Privacy and control of personalized
medicine information will be one of the most significant issues facing
151 “Racially-Tailored” Medicine, at 449.
152 Id.
153 See Jonathan Kahn, Race-ing Patients/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political Geography
of Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 353, 382–83 (2007). Haplotyping
is a tool for determining geographic ancestry based on an individual’s DNA matched
against an international database, the International HapMap Project.
154 Id.
155 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Pharmacogenetics: Ethical Issues 42 (2003), available at
www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/pharmacogenetics_report.pdf.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Clinical Benefits of Pharmacogenomics, at 792.
159 Press Release, NIH, NIH Seeks Input on Proposed Repository for Genetic Information
(Aug. 30, 2006), available at www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug2006/od-30.htm.
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providers in the years to come. As discussed above, while state and
federal lawmakers have begun to address these issues, current laws are
inconsistent in their protection of genetic information.
The privacy and security regulations promulgated under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule provide a federal floor of protection for “protected
health information” (PHI).160 This would include genetic testing and
personalized medicine data if that information were created or received
by a healthcare provider, health plan, or healthcare clearing house.161
However, PHI does not include information created or received by
other entities, such as employers or insurance companies. Under GINA,
however, employers are required to apply the same privacy protections
for “genetic information” as are applicable to medical information
protected under HIPAA and the ADA.162 In addition, GINA mandates
that genetic information falls within HIPAA’s definition of “protected
health information” and must be treated as such when in the plan’s or
insurer’s possession.163
In general, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires that an individual
authorize the use and disclosure of his or her PHI.164 Despite this
seemingly expansive protection—as described in the Notice of Privacy
Practices providers and insurers are required to provide to patients—
there are broad exceptions where individual authorization is not
required, including uses and disclosures for treatment, payment,
and healthcare operations.165 In addition, there is a long list of
situations where authorization is not required because of public policy
considerations (e.g., abuse or neglect, public emergencies, regulatory
oversight, etc.).166 Thus, broad exceptions for use and disclosure of
PHI without individual authorization result in the protections offered
to patients by the HIPAA Privacy Rule being somewhat illusory.
Before the implementation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, many states
had enacted laws to provide protection for the confidentiality of
genetic testing information. In general, these laws give more protection to PHI than the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which preempts only state
160 42 U.S.C. § 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164. HIPAA contains two different sections relevant to
a discussion of genetic information: one addressing non-discrimination in the health
insurance context (42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg et. seq.) and the other addressing privacy of PHI
(42 U.S.C. § 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). The non-discrimination provisions are discussed above under Federal Legal Landscape, HIPAA.
161 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
162 GINA, tit. 2, § 206.
163 GINA, tit. 1, § 105(a).
164 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1). HIPAA does not provide individuals who suffer damages as
a result of any unlawful use or disclosure of PHI a private cause of action against the
covered entity.
165 Id. § 164.506(a).
166 Id. § 164.512(a)–(l).
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laws that give less protection to PHI.167 Thus, evaluating the interaction
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule with state laws is critical to understanding
the privacy protection of genetic information.
In general, state laws make an individual’s authorization a prerequisite
for disclosing genetic information, even where the HIPAA Privacy Rule
would not require authorization.168 While a fifty-state survey is beyond the
scope of this article, it is noteworthy that twenty-seven states require an
individual’s consent for the disclosure of genetic testing information.169
In addition, some states require individual authorization for activities
such as retaining genetic information and performing genetic tests.170
Although states frequently carve out exceptions for situations such
as confirmation of paternity, identification of deceased persons, and
criminal investigations and prosecutions, these exceptions are far more
limited than under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. As a result, states that offer
protection of genetic information truly give the individual the ability
to control access to that information. Even so, that protection—and its
scope—is inconsistent from state to state. As a result, the strength of
a state’s laws protecting genetic information likely will determine how
willing patients are to disclose that information, and providers who collect or use genetic information will need to closely follow restrictions
applicable in their jurisdictions.

Privacy and the duty to warn
Every state recognizes a common law or statutory right to privacy.171
Generally, geneticists are prohibited from disclosing a patient’s medical genetic information without the patient’s written authorization.172
An exception exists for medical geneticists to disclose PHI to a patient’s
friends and family members so that they may assist in the patient’s
care.173 However, this exception does not allow a medical geneticist
167 45 C.F.R. § 160.203.
168 The scope of “genetic information” is defined differently in various states. Oregon, for
example, defines “genetic information” to include information about blood relatives
while California’s statute refers to “genetic characteristics,” defined as a scientifically
identifiable gene or chromosome that is known to be a cause of a disease or disorder.
See Or. Rev. Stat. § 192.531(11); Cal. Ins. Code § 10147(b).
169 These states include Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Washington. See Nat’l Conference
of State Legislatures, State Genetic Summary Table on Privacy Laws,
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
170 Id.
171 Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: Meeting the Growing
Demands of Genetic Research, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 809, 809 (citing Standards for the
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462–829 (2000)).
172 Laura J. Cole & Lynn D. Fleisher, Update on HIPAA Privacy: Are You Ready?, 5 Genetics in
Med. 183, 186 (2003).
173 Id.
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operating under the HIPAA Privacy Rule to disclose PHI to benefit the
patient’s family members.174
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows medical geneticists to disclose information to prevent a “serious and imminent threat to the health or
safety of a person or the public.”175 From an ethical standpoint, a physician’s duty to warn requires the “availability of medical interventions
to reduce the risk of developing a disease or to lessen the ensuing
harm.”176 For infectious diseases, for example, New York requires that
a doctor warn a third party “when the service performed on behalf
of the patient necessarily implicate[d] protection of ... other identified persons foreseeably at risk because of [the] relationship with the
patient, whom the doctor knows or should know may suffer harm
by relying on prudent performance of th[e] medical service.”177
However, “[i]t is questionable whether the uncertain probability of a
future genetic disease constitutes an imminent harm or a threat to
the public interest.”178 The American Society of Clinical Oncology suggests that “federal requirements to justify a breach of confidentiality
are [not] met by genetic syndromes of cancer predisposition.”179
There are varying successes in reducing a predisposition toward disease with the use of genetic information. For example, women with
BRCA mutations—gene mutations that may determine a woman’s likelihood of developing breast or ovarian cancer180—can reduce their risk
of developing breast or ovarian cancer by 75 percent if they undergo
surgical removal of the ovaries and fallopian tubes after childbearing.181
Some studies suggest that screening and prevention in hereditary
breast, colon, and thyroid cancers is efficacious.182 Other genetic diseases, such as phenylketonuria, can be prevented through such means
as dietary modification.183 However, there are minimal or no medical
interventions for some genetic disorders, such as Huntington disease
and Alzheimer’s disease.184 Less than one percent of physicians believe
174 Id.
175 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i).
176 Kenneth Offit et al., The “Duty to Warn” a Patient’s Family Members About Hereditary
Disease Risks, 292 JAMA 1469, 1470 (2004) [hereinafter Duty to Warn].
177 Tenuto v. Lederle Lab., 687 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (N.Y. 1997).
178 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
179 Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology, American Society of Clinical Oncology Policy Statement
Update: Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility, 21 J. Clinical Oncology 2397, 2403 (2003)
[hereinafter ASCO Policy Statement].
180 Mary-Claire King et al., Tamoxifen and Breast Cancer Incidence Among Women
with Inherited Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2, 18 J. Am. Med. Ass’n. 2251 (2001).
181 Duty to Warn, at 1470 (citing Noah D. Kauff et al., Risk-Reducing Salpingo-oophorectomy
in Women with a BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutation, 347 New Eng. J. Med. 1609 (2002)).
182 Id. (internal citations omitted).
183 Id. (citing Wylie Burke et al., Genetic Test Evaluation: Information Needs of Clinicians,
Policy Makers, and the Public, 156 Am. J. Epidemiology 311 (2002)).
184 Id.
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that it is ethical to breach patient confidentiality when no medical
intervention exists.185
State courts hint that providers may be obligated in some instances
to share genetic test results with a patient’s at-risk relatives.186 In Safer
v. Estate of Pack, a daughter sued the estate of her father’s physician for
failing to warn her about the risk of familial adenomatous polyposis,187
a condition that leads to colon cancer by 40 years of age.188 Her father’s
physician diagnosed her father with the disease 30 years prior to her
diagnosis of advanced colorectal cancer.189 Had she been informed of
the risk, she claimed, she would have had a prophylactic colectomy in
her late teen years.190 Although this New Jersey court ultimately decided
against the daughter based on evidence that she had colorectal screening at age 10, the court stated that the doctor’s duty to warn relatives is
not always fulfilled by informing the patient about the genetic nature
of the disease.191 Physicians must take reasonable steps to ensure that atrisk family members receive the warning.192 One commentator worries
that this duty might overburden some physicians, because it is difficult
to locate family members of patients who are unwilling to share the
news of their increased risk themselves.193
In Pate v. Threlkel, a daughter filed suit in Florida against her mother’s
physician because he did not warn her of her elevated risk of hereditary thyroid cancer.194 If physicians recognized this condition early, she
argued, they could have intervened by removing her thyroid gland and
treating her with hormones.195 The mother’s physician never informed
the mother that she needed to tell her daughter about the elevated
cancer risk.196 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the physician
had a duty to inform the mother of the daughter’s risk; it held that
privity was irrelevant, because the standard of care was intended to
benefit the children.197

185 Id. (citing R. Beth Dugan et al., Duty to Warn At-Risk Relatives for Genetic Disease: Genetic
Counselors’ Clinical Experience, 119C Am. J. Med. Genetics 27 (2003); Marni J. Falk et al.,
Medical Geneticists’ Duty to Warn At-Risk Relatives for Genetic Disease, 120A Am. J. Med.
Genetics 374 (2003)).
186 Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics
Exceptionalism, 40 Jurimetrics J. 21, 35 (1999).
187 Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
194 Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d. 278 (Fla. 1995).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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Because of the potential implication of genetic information for parents, siblings, and children, some commentators suggest that patients
who undergo genetic testing should designate recipients of genetic
information to enable physicians to contact family members about elevated risk potentials safely and easily, even if the patient has died before
development of a test.198 It is foreseeable that genetic tests will become
much more accurate in determining an individual’s predisposition to
certain diseases, providing a compelling reason for disclosure to at-risk
family members. In addition, more preventive measures with proven
efficacy will be developed, increasing the likelihood that a judge will
find a duty to warn third parties of test results. A potential negative
externality to disclosure to at-risk family members will be the loss of
study participants, but it would be wise for providers to seek consent to
family-member disclosures proactively.
In general, a physician’s duty to warn is discretionary.199 A Presidential Commission established several conditions for a physician to
breach confidentiality ethically by disclosing information to a patient’s
relatives. Three of the conditions are:
(1) the high likelihood of harm if the relative were not
warned,
(2) the identifiability of the relative, and
(3) the notion that the harm resulting from failure to
disclose would outweigh the harm resulting from
disclosure.200
Professional societies have expressed the opinion that physicians
should advise patients about the usefulness of conveying genetic test
results to at-risk family members. The American Medical Association’s
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs considered a proposal that
physicians should provide a “genetic Miranda warning” before
conducting a genetic test.201 This proposal would have required
physicians to inform patients of situations in which the physicians would
feel compelled to breach confidentiality by informing at-risk family

198 Annette R. Patterson et al., Custodianship of Genetic Information: Clinical Challenges
and Professional Responsibility, 23 J. Clinical Oncology 2100, 2102 (2005).
199 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
200 Id. (citing Am. Soc’y of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcomm. on Familial
Disclosure, ASHG Statement: Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information,
62 Am. J. Human Genetics 474 (1998); Nat’l Info. Res. on Ethics & Human Genetics,
Screening and Counseling for Genetic Conditions: The Ethical, Social, and Legal Implications
of Genetic Screening, Counseling, and Education Programs 1 (1983), available at
www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/geneticscreening.pdf;
Comm. on Assessing Genetic Risks, Inst. of Med., Assessing Genetic Risks:
Implications for Health and Social Policy (1994)).
201 Duty to Warn, at 1471.
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members about elevated genetic predispositions.202 After deliberation,
the council decided to suggest that physicians should inform patients
about the “circumstances under which they would expect patients to
notify biological relatives of the availability of information related to the
risk of disease.”203 Similarly, the American Society of Clinical Oncology
suggests that physicians should “remind patients of the importance of
communicating test results to family members ….”204 It is the American
Society of Clinical Oncology’s position that informing their patients of
the risk discharges the physicians’ duty to warn.205

Research and Patient-Tailored Medicine
As discussed above, until the clinical research emphasis shifts
from participants’ racial and ethnic backgrounds toward individuals’
genetic make-up, researchers should make efforts to include minority
populations in trials to ensure equal benefit among different races. In
addition to including minority participants, researchers may promote
equal representation of minority groups by including experts from
minority groups in the research and review process and by including
minorities in institutional review boards.206 For instance, researchers
from minority groups could evaluate DNA databanks to ensure that
minority populations are adequately represented in the research.207
“Biobanks,” which store and analyze human tissue samples, hold
tremendous promise for researchers mining tissue samples for genetic
information.208 As emerging technology reduces the cost of genetic
testing, the number of genome-wide association studies will increase
tremendously.209 Although biobanks hold great promise, the American
public has concerns about providing genetic samples to biobanks. One
concern is the potential that hackers will steal genetic information.210
The public also is concerned with genetic codes that contain unobservable, secret information about themselves.211 Even individuals who do
not have concerns about their own genetic information may have concerns about the implications for their parents, siblings, and children
202 Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n, CEJA Report 9-A-03,
Disclosure of Familial Risk in Genetic Testing, 8 Genetic Testing 356 (2004).
203 Id.
204 ASCO Policy Statement, at 2397.
205 Id.
206 Pharmacogenomics, at 52–53.
207 Charles Weijer & Paul B. Miller, Protecting Communities in Pharmacogenetic
and Pharmacogenomic Research, 4 Pharmacogenomics J. 9–16 (2004).
208 Edward J. Janger, Genetic Information, Privacy and Insolvency, 33 J.L. Med, & Ethics 79 (2005).
209 Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Meeting the Growing Demands of Genetic Research,
34 J. L. Med. & Ethics 809, 810 (2006).
210 Mary L. Durham, How Research Will Adapt to HIPAA: A View from Within the Healthcare
Delivery System, 28 Am. J.L. & Med. 491, 495 (2002).
211 Id.
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if their genetic makeups were exposed.212 Thus, to assuage potential
participants’ fears about participation, the informed consent process
for biobank donation should explain clearly the privacy protections
that will be implemented.
Many donors demand extra protection because genetic information is unique in comparison to other health information:
1.

[I]t remains largely stable throughout life;

2.

[G]enetic fingerprints are remarkably identifiable;

3.

[G]enetic conditions are inherited, and thus
genetic information can reveal information about
an individual’s current family members and future
offspring; and

4.

[G]enetic information can transcend health status to
reveal predispositions and personal characteristics.213

Despite affirmative actions to ensure the privacy of highly sensitive
genetic information,214 researchers worry that legislatures, in passing
statutes that focus on genetic privacy rather than health data privacy in
general, will stir unwarranted fear that may discourage individuals from
seeking genetic testing.215 Although genetic information is unique,
concerns about privacy may be explained by the general decline in the
public trust of health professionals. Seventy percent of Americans have
concerns about disclosing their medical records to researchers;216 yet
Americans support both ensuring the privacy of their medical records
and encouraging medical research.217

Federal policy for the protection of human subjects
Which specific protections apply to genetic research depends in part
upon whether a study constitutes “human subjects research.” The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Common Rule) sets
guidelines that researchers must follow when they conduct human subjects research.218 The Common Rule defines “research” as any “systematic
212 Id.
213 James G. Hodge, Jr., Ethical Issues Concerning Genetic Testing and Screening in Public
Health, 125C Am. J. Med. Genetics 66, 69 (2004) (citing Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures,
Genetics Policy and Law: A Report for Policymakers (2001)) [hereinafter Ethical Issues Concerning Genetic Testing].
214 Joanne Hustead & Janlori Goldman, Genetics and Privacy, 28 Am. J.L. & Med. 285 (2002).
215 Ethical Issues Concerning Genetic Testing, at 69.
216 John M. Eisenberg, Can You Keep a Secret?: Measuring the Performance of Those
Entrusted with Personal Health Information, 16 J. Gen. Internal Med. 132 (2001).
217 George J. Annas, Medical Privacy and Medical Research—Judging the New Federal
Regulations, 346 New Eng. J. Med. 216 (2002) [hereinafter Judging the New
Federal Regulations].
218 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a). Researchers must provide the Office of Protection from Research
Risks with a satisfactory assurance that their research complies with the Common Rule.
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investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”219
Of particular interest in the biobank context, the Common Rule
states that “[p]rivate information must be individually identifiable
(i.e., the identity of the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the
investigator or associated with the information) in order for obtaining
the information to constitute research involving human subjects.”220
Specifically, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) of
HHS takes the position that data are individually identifiable “when
they can be linked to specific individuals by the investigator(s) either
directly or indirectly through coding systems.”221 Thus, it seems likely
that genetic research, which depends on identifiable genetic information, would constitute human research.
The OHRP provides a safe harbor, however, for information that
cannot be linked. A guidance document states that if the following conditions are met, a study does not constitute human subjects research,
because the information is not individually identifiable:
(1) the private information or specimens were not collected specifically for the currently proposed research project through
an interaction or intervention with living individuals; and
(2) the investigator(s) cannot readily ascertain the identity of
the individual(s) to whom the coded private information or
specimens pertain because, for example:
(a) the investigators and the holder of the key enter into
an agreement prohibiting the release of the key to the
investigators under any circumstances, until the individuals are deceased (note that the HHS regulations
do not require the IRB to review and approve this
agreement);
(b) there are IRB-approved written policies and operating procedures for a repository or data management
center that prohibit the release of the key to the investigators under any circumstances, until the individuals
are deceased; or

219 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d).
220 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f ).
221 Office for Human Research Prots., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Guidance on Research
Involving Coded Private Information on Biological Specimens 3 (2004), available at
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf.
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(c) there are other legal requirements prohibiting the
release of the key to the investigators, until the individuals are deceased.222
Whether coded or anonymized genetic information is “identifiable PHI” remains unclear. HHS recognizes this issue but has not
promulgated any clarifying regulations. Some researchers claim that
“de-identified” genotypic data are actually potentially identifiable.223
For example, single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), DNA sequence
variations between members of the same species, can be used to identify individuals.224 There are databases of SNP data in the public realm.
It is possible that one who has access to individual genetic data might
be able to match that data with public SNP data.225 Once this is done,
any previously de-identified information linked to that individual in
the public records would become available, severing anonymity.226
Researchers currently are exploring algorithms called Re-Identification
of Data In Trails (REIDIT) to link public genomic data to individual
patients using patient location visit patterns.227
There are some methods that researchers who work with genetic
information might use to prevent re-identification. One technique is to
change randomly some SNPs for each participant before releasing the
genetic information.228 However, this is not an ideal situation, because
researchers would like to use the true and correct genetic information,
not data in which “noise” has been introduced. Another method would
be to “group SNPs into bins.”229 By “[d]isregarding exact genomic locations of SNPs[, one] increases the number of records that share the same
values ....”230 Some researchers remain skeptical about this approach
because “the pattern of binned values is unlikely to match anyone other
than the owner of the DNA.”231 In addition, binning would make genetic
analysis difficult.232 Others have suggested encrypting identifying information associated with the genetic information, such as subjects’ names
and social security numbers, into pseudonyms.233
222 Id. at 4.
223 Zhen Lin et al., Genomic Research and Human Subject Privacy, 305 Sci. 183,183 (2004)
[hereinafter Genomic Research].
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (Not) to Protect Genomic Data Privacy
in a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-Identification to Evaluate and Design
Anonymity Protection Systems, 37 J. Biomedical Informatics 179 (2004)
[hereinafter Using Trail Re-Identification].
228 Id. (citing Leon Willenborg & Ton de Waal, Elements of Statistical Disclosure Control
(2001)).
229 Genomic Research, at 183.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Using Trail Re-Identification, at 179.
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Where the Common Rule does apply, it contemplates the protection of privacy of participants in research studies. The relevant section
of the Common Rule states:
In order to approve research covered by this policy,
the IRB shall determine that … [w]hen appropriate,
there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of
subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data.234
In addition, the Common Rule mandates that subjects receive
“[a] statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality
of records identifying the subject will be maintained[.]”235 Further, if
asked, researchers should be able to explain to the subjects how their
information will be protected.236
To ensure potential research participants are informed adequately
about the risks and benefits of taking part in genetic clinical studies,
researchers must obtain participants’ informed consent.237 The basic
components of this process include disclosing the study’s purpose, the
benefits as well as the risks, and the roles of the participants in the
study.238 See the earlier section, Informed consent of research subjects, on
pages 24 and 25, for a discussion of related manufacturer liabilities.
As discussed above, clinical studies, especially human genetic research
studies, based on homogenous samplings will be biased in their applicability if race and ethnicity are not taken into consideration.239 Bias
occurs in many clinical studies, partially because many racial or ethnic
minorities do not wish or are not asked to participate as research subjects. If racial or ethnic minorities do participate, researchers must be
sensitive to issues that may arise if minority participants may not understand the purpose or potential risks and benefits involved in research,
whether due to cross-cultural issues, low literacy rates, lack of access to
healthcare, lack of education, or other factors.240

234
235
236
237

45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a), (a)(7).
Id. § 46.116(a)(5).
Id.
Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., Informed Consent, www.genome.gov/10002332
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
238 Christen Brownlee, Johns Hopkins Med. Insts., Study Into Informed Consent for Clinical
Trials, Med. News Today, Jan. 14, 2008, www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/93839.php
(last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
239 Kjersti Aagaard-Tillery et al., Sample Bias Among Women with Retained DNA Samples
for Future Genetic Studies, 1 Obstetrics & Gynecology 1115, 1116 (2006). See also PatientTailored Medicine, Part One, and the earlier discussion of the role of the Food and Drug
Administration.
240 See Gordon Gong et al., Ethical, Legal and Social Issues of Genetic Studies with African
Immigrants as Research Subjects, 100 J. Nat’l Med. Ass’n 1073, 1076 (2008).
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule and research
The HIPAA Privacy Rule was not adopted either to encourage or
discourage research.241 The Privacy Rule strives “to strike a balance by
minimizing the privacy risks of research participants, while not impeding the conduct of vital national and international research.”242
The advancement of medical knowledge through research requires
access to medical information.243 In accordance with the Common
Rule, research protocols and consent forms must be reviewed by an
institutional review board (IRB).244 Researchers must receive authorization to obtain medical records for each individual genetic research
project; however, because authorizations cannot be re-used, a new
consent to use medical records must be obtained for each project.245
The HIPAA Privacy Rules provide that valid written authorizations to
release PHI must include:
(i)	A description of the information to be used or disclosed that identifies the information in a specific
and meaningful fashion.
(ii)	The name or other specific identification of the
person(s), or class of persons, authorized to make
the requested use or disclosure.
(iii)	The name or other specific identification of the
person(s), or class of persons, to whom the covered
entity may make the requested use or disclosure.
(iv)	A description of each purpose of the requested use
or disclosure. The statement “at the request of the
individual” is a sufficient description of the purpose
when an individual initiates the authorization and
does not, or elects not to, provide a statement of
the purpose.
(v)	An expiration date or an expiration event that
relates to the individual or the purpose of the use
or disclosure. The statement “end of the research
study,” “none,” or similar language is sufficient if the
authorization is for a use or disclosure of protected
241 Judging the New Federal Regulations, at 216.
242 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
14,775, 14,793 (Mar. 27, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
243 Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, Use and Disclosure of Health Information in Genetic
Research: Weighing the Impact of the New Federal Medical Privacy Rule, 28 Am. J.L. & Med.
309, 310 (2002) (citing Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy 152 (1999)).
244 45 C.F.R. § 46; Judging the New Federal Regulations, at 216–17 (2002).
245 45 C.F.R. § 46; Lynn S. Muller & Dominick L. Flarey, Genetic Research Implications,
9 Lippincotts Case Mgmt. 45 (2004).
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health information for research, including for the
creation and maintenance of a research database
or research repository.
(vi)	Signature of the individual and date. If the authorization is signed by a personal representative of
the individual, a description of such representative’s authority to act for the individual must also
be provided.246

Sharing information between researchers
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the HIPAA Privacy Rule impedes
sharing of information between researchers. For instance, in a Johns
Hopkins genetics study on prostate cancer covering 14 institutions,
the institutions refused to combine data into a centralized database
of genetic data for family members. Such a database could have been
used to search for cancer susceptibility genes across hospitals, but in
refusing to do so, the hospitals cited HIPAA Privacy Rule concerns.247
Instead, each institution conducts its own analysis and shares a summary with the other researchers.248 In such situations, each institution
makes its own decision whether to participate—HIPAA is the floor of
protection.
In any case, researchers must inform their subjects about opportunities to share genetic information among researchers, and must explain
the risks and benefits from their participation. 249 In addition, study
participants must be given the opportunity to refuse participation in
the research.250

Conclusion
Although personalized medicine is an exciting new phenomenon
that has the potential of revolutionizing medicine in the coming years,
there are many obstacles.251 In the present regulatory, healthcare
industry, and societal climate, clinical trials for drug safety and effectiveness often fail to include minority participants. As a result, much
remains unknown about the way in which an individual of a particular
race, ethnic background, or genotype will react to certain medications. There is a longstanding need in America to remedy disparities
246 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(i)–(vi).
247 Jocelyn Kaiser, Privacy Rule Creates Bottleneck for U.S. Biomedical Researchers,
305 Sci. 168, 169 (2004).
248 Id.
249 Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Meeting the Growing Demands of Genetic Research,
34 J. L. Med. & Ethics 809 (2006).
250 Id.
251 Promise of Personalized Medicine.
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in healthcare access for minorities. As a corollary, there is a compelling
moral and ethical argument that race-based therapies must be protected by the courts from excessive legal burdens so that the United
States can achieve greater equality in the healthcare system by fostering the growth of both new and existing race-based therapies.

Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 2

Journal of Health and Life Sciences Law Order Form
Title
Journal of Health and Life Sciences Law
(1 year subscription)
Subtotal

Quantity

ISBN
Price
9781422445853/ $149.00/$199.00
9781422445860

Subtotal
Total Amount Charged to Credit Cards $________ (LEAVE BLANK)
*applicable tax and shipping & handling charges will be added to your bill and charged
to your credit card.
Name ______________________________ Member ID# _______________________
Company _____________________________________________________________
Shipping Address _______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
Phone ________________________________________________________________
Email _________________________________________________________________
Please indicate payment method (check one):
□ American Express
□ VISA

□ MasterCard

Card # __________________________ Exp. Date ___/___/____
Signature ____________________________________________
Billing Address (if different than shipping):
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

FAX THIS ORDER FORM TO:
Aditi Vaish
Custom Legal Publishing
LEXIS/NEXIS
(434) 972-7531

OR MAIL TO:
Aditi Vaish
Custom Legal Publishing
LEXIS/NEXIS
701 E. Water Street
Charlottesville, VA
22902

ORDER NOW!
Visit www.healthlawyers.org/bookstore
Or call 1-800-533-1637

